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Abstract: A reorientation is needed in methodological debate about the role of 
intuitions in philosophy.  Methodological debate has lost sight of the reason why 
it makes sense to focus on questions about intuitions when thinking about the 
methods or epistemology of philosophy. The problem is an approach to 
methodology that focuses almost exclusively on questions about some evidential 
role that intuitions may or may not play in philosophers’ arguments. A new 
approach is needed. Approaching methodological questions about the role of 
intuitions in philosophy with an abductive model of philosophical inquiry in 
mind will help ensure the debate doesn’t lose sight of what motivates the debate. 
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I have long harbored misgivings about the focus given to intuitions in 
recent debates about philosophical methodology. This article is my best 
effort to give voice to those misgivings and to suggest  how  debate  
might be reoriented to address them. 
Section 1 articulates my misgivings. In short, the concern is that debate in 
philosophical methodology has got sidetracked by focusing on some eviden- 
tial role that intuitions may or may not play in philosophers’ arguments rather 
than in philosophy. By saying that debate has got sidetracked, I mean that 
debate has ended up proceeding in such a way that it is completely disen- 
gaged from the reasons why looking at the evidential role of intuitions seemed 
like a promising starting place for the methodologist. It has lost sight of why  
it makes sense to methodologically examine the role of intuitions in philoso- 
phy. It is worth noting from the start that there is currently somewhat of a 
fashion to voice misgivings about the focus that has been given to discussion 
of intuitions in debates about philosophical methodology. This article is not 
part of that trend. Indeed, my misgivings extend to that fashion, and the 
examples I use in section 1 include a number of contributions that are part of 
that trend about which I have misgivings. 
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Section 2 makes a suggestion as to how methodological debate might 
be reoriented to address my misgivings. In short, the suggestion is to rec- 
ommend an abductive model of philosophical inquiry  according  to  
which the overall project of giving a theory of some phenomenon is at 
heart an abductive exercise. This model allows for constructive examina- 
tion of the methods of philosophy but doesn’t allow us to so easily lose 
sight of the reasons we have for taking seriously the idea that intuitions  
are central to philosophical methods and epistemology.  This model is  
also distinct from various other recent suggestions that philosophical 
inquiry may have a more abductive flavor than is typically recognized. A 
significant portion of the work of this section is thus to distinguish the 
model advanced from  various  distinct ideas one might entertain about  
the relation between philosophy and abduction. One mistake, essentially 
the same thing I have misgivings about, would be to assume that any 
helpful model for understanding the role of intuitions in philosophical 
inquiry would have to be a model of how  intuitions  play  (or  do  not 
play) an evidential role in philosophers’ arguments. 
 
1. Misgivings 
For some time  now,  discussion  about  philosophical  methods  has  tended 
to focus on the role of intuitions in philosophy. In fact, the focus has been 
rather more specific than that. The discussion has been about whether 
intuitions play an evidential role.  And this discussion tends  to be focused  
on philosophers’ arguments and what role intuitions are playing in those 
arguments, in particular whether it is evidential. I have misgivings  about  
this particular focus. But before I get to those, let me make  clear  that  I 
don’t think it is a mistake to focus on the  role  of intuitions  in philosophy 
or even on some evidential role that intuitions may or may not play. 
 
1.1 Why Focus on Intuitions in Methodology? 
I do think that it makes sense for  methodologists to focus on the role     
of intuitions. Why? Because there is a very plausible picture of phil- 
osophy’s methodology and epistemology that gives intuitions a central 
role.1 What is this picture? And why is it plausible? 
To answer those questions, let me start with the observation that the 
epistemology of philosophy presents a bit of a puzzle. Here’s one way  
 
1 Here I distinguish between the epistemology of  philosophy  and  the  methodology. 
This is an important distinction. The issues of how philosophers proceed  generally and  
how philosophers go about providing justification for their views versus the issue of what 
justifies philosophical positions are distinct matters. The two are closely linked, however, 
and often not clearly distinguished in the literature. In this article, I urge a reorientation      
of all metaphilosophical discussions in this general ballpark. 
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to look at the puzzle. Ask yourself: What could possibly provide evi- 
dential support in philosophical inquiry? In some domains, one can use 
one’s senses to gather empirical evidence. But when we want to know 
about morality, metaphysics, and art, such evidence seems to be of lim- 
ited importance. Instead, when we philosophize about  such things we  
use our rational faculties; we reason counterfactually about hypotheti- 
cal/imaginary cases; we place some (pro tanto) faith in our pretheoretic 
beliefs, our ordinary ways of thinking, in the judgments we are dis-  
posed to have about philosophically important matters when we reflect 
upon them, and so on. We can’t get all our evidence via the senses, 
memory, and testimony. It seems that some of it has to come from else- 
where. But where could it come from? Approaching from this direction, 
the puzzle is that it can be a little mysterious where the justification for 
the sorts of claims we want to make in philosophy comes from. What 
assurance have we that we are on  the  path  to  truth?  Here’s  another 
way to look at what I take to be the same central puzzle. Ask yourself: 
What is going on when philosophers philosophize? We have a clear 
enough understanding of scientific experimental methods, and it might 
look as if philosophers do some very similar things. Where scientists 
perform experiments to test theories, philosophers perform thought 
experiments. But what plays the analogous role to observations in 
philosophy? 
So far, we haven’t really used the word “intuition.” But both these 
ways of looking at the puzzle seem to be very naturally captured in 
terms of intuitions. Just use the word “intuition” to label that whose 
status in the epistemology of philosophy generates these sorts of puz- 
zles. Philosophers seem to use apparently nonempirical judgments 
about all sorts of propositions, cases, and theories in building their the- 
ories. Such judgments somehow seem to feature prominently in stories 
about which theories philosophers accept/reject and about the support 
or justification philosophers provide for theories. Historical associa- 
tions of the word “intuition” facilitate an analogy between “intuitions” 
and perceptual judgments. In many ways, the word “intuition” is a very 
natural one to use. 
Out of all this drops a prima facie somewhat plausible picture of 
philosophy’s methods and epistemology: philosophers use  intuitions,  
and their use of intuitions has something to do with evidence, justifica- 
tion, or support (where what is meant by “intuitions” is a somewhat 
vague, rather imprecise notion that collects various things like pretheo- 
retic beliefs and judgments we are disposed to have concerning actual  
and hypothetical cases, and other stuff too). We might call this picture  
the “na€ıve picture.” It thus makes sense for methodological examina-  
tion in philosophy to begin with examining the idea that philosophers   
use intuitions, and that their use of intuitions has something to do with 
evidence/justification/support. 
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Note that this na€ıve picture does little to solve the epistemological 
puzzles about philosophical inquiry. It simply gives them a name and 
provides focus for methodological discussion. The role, nature, and 
epistemic status of these “intuitions” are hardly cleared up simply by 
naming them. For instance, I don’t take the na€ıve understanding—as I 
understand it—to come down definitively either way on the question of 
whether the justification that intuitions ultimately do or do not provide 
would be a priori or a posteriori.2 
 
1.2 Losing Sight of the Reasons to Focus on Intuitions 
My misgivings about the current state of methodological debate pri- 
marily concern the way it has focused on whether intuitions do  or  
should play an evidential role in arguments in philosophy. I think this 
focus has led to methodologists losing sight of why it makes sense to 
methodologically examine the role of intuitions in philosophy.  In order  
to articulate my misgivings, I want to focus on a recent trend in philo- 
sophical methodology. A great number of philosophers have recently 
come out as being rather down on the idea that intuitions play an 
important evidential role in philosophy. I don’t claim  this is some kind  
of coherent movement—the relevant philosophers don’t agree and have 
very different general outlooks—but at a  certain  level  of  abstraction 
the trend is there. 
 
1. Williamson (2007) thinks philosophers make a mistake if they  
think their evidence consists largely in their intuitions. 
2. Ichikawa (2014) thinks that philosophers’  appeals  to  intuitions  
are largely not about adducing evidence but rather about dialecti- 
cal maneuvering. 
3. Cappelen (2012) thinks that philosophers don’t actually make the 
mistake of relying on intuitions as evidence. 
4. Deutsch (2010) thinks that what matters is not whether a counter- 
example is intuitive but whether it is a counterexample, and con- 
sequently that focusing on intuitions is a mistake. 
5. Kornblith (2007) thinks that intuitions serve  as  evidence  about  
the nature of our concepts but  that  since  philosophers  shouldn’t 
be quite so interested in concepts, we should stop most of our 
intuition mongering. 
6. Various folks think that we need to restrict our use of intuitions 
as evidence on the basis of empirical evidence that intuitions are 
 
2 Some even think the terminology of “intuitions” is actively unhelpful. One of 
Cappelen’s (2012) claims is that talking in terms of intuitions has been a great source of 
distraction in methodology. As we shall see, I agree that methodologists have been dis- 
tracted but I don’t think abandoning talk of intuitions will get rid of the problem. 
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unreliable (see, e.g., Swain, Alexander, and Weinberg 2008; Wein- 
berg, Nichols, and Stich 2001).3 
7. And, various people, starting with Cummins (1998), worry that 
whether or not intuitions can be calibrated they are of no use to     
us in philosophy. 
 
Given the na€ıve picture of intuitions’ place in philosophy, this cur-  
rent fashion in methodology might seem somewhat strange. One might 
wonder whether methodologists can possibly hold the views that their 
slogans advertise. They wield slogans like “Philosophers don’t use 
intuitions!” and “Philosophers shouldn’t use intuitions!” But can  it  
really be that the na€ıve picture of the role of intuitions in philosophy is  
so very wrong/problematic? Is that really what  these  philosophers  
think? Philosophy, if it is possible, must have some epistemic grounding 
even if it is puzzling. The na€ıve view may be vague and imprecise—we 
surely want a much better understanding of these “intuitions” and their 
role in philosophy—but can these methodologists really have such a 
problem with it? The answer might come  as a surprise  to an outsider    
to the debate.  The answer is no. Once one looks behind the slogans, it    
is clear that none of these methodologists really has a big problem with 
the na€ıve picture at all. 
Let’s look a little closer at each in turn. 
 
1. It turns out that Williamson’s beef is with  philosophers  who  
refuse to treat the claims they judge to be true as evidence and 
instead treat their evidence as consisting only (or largely) of psy- 
chological claims such as it is intuitive that p. We can agree with 
him about this: it would be problematic if philosophers thought 
their evidence was purely psychological; this would concede ever 
so much unnecessary ground to the skeptic. But it is not as if Wil- 
liamson wants to deny that our ordinary capacities for thinking 
about things in some way supply our evidence in philosophy. 
2. Ichikawa’s position is very similar to Williamson’s (with some 
interesting additional claims about how use of  the  word  
“intuition” serves a dialectical purpose: to avoid begging the 
question). 
3. It turns out Cappelen’s ire concerns metaphilosophers’ obsession 
with the idea that philosophers rely on intuitions as construed in 
certain very particular ways as evidence in a distinctive way. His 
conclusion that philosophers don’t rely on evidence  is  made  on 
the basis of an empirical project examining philosophical texts. 
When Cappelen finds no evidence that philosophers use 
 
3 I have contributed to this literature (Andow forthcoming). 
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intuitions, it turns out that what he was looking for  was some-  
thing very particular: use of judgments (i) that have a characteris-  
tic phenomenology, (ii) that are treated as having no need of 
justification, (iii) that philosophers remain  inclined  to  endorse 
even if their arguments for the contents of those judgments are 
revealed to be bad arguments, (iv) whose use in philosophy is dis- 
tinctive or characteristic to philosophy, and/or (v) that are neces- 
sary claims without the other features (i–iv). We can concede 
Cappelen this point easily; it is not as if Cappelen denies that 
“philosophers rely on intuitions” is true where (a) we construe 
“intuitions” in a rather less rich way (perhaps using what Wein- 
berg and Alexander dub a “thin” characterization, that is, identi- 
fying them merely as “instances of some fairly generic and 
epistemologically uncontroversial category of mental states or epi- 
sodes” [2014, 189]; see Andow 2016 for an independent argument 
for such an approach) and (b) “philosophers rely on intuitions” is 
not understood to mean something which precludes that philoso- 
phers are willing to provide extra reasons to believe the intuitive 
claims. 
4. Deutsch doesn’t really seem to deny that our  identification  of  
cases as counterexamples must ultimately rely upon some sort of 
intuition. He just thinks that what we are looking for is genuine 
counterexamples and that the appropriate response to people who 
don’t share your intuition that something  is a counterexample is,   
in the first instance, to give them reasons to accept that it is a 
counterexample. But who would deny that? 
5. It turns out Kornblith thinks that intuitions are an essential first 
step in inquiry into philosophically interesting phenomena but 
that philosophers often take intuition-based inquiry too far (for 
example, they try to give an account that preserves as many intu- 
itions as possible). Again, this seems perfectly reasonable, and not 
so much at odds with the na€ıve picture.4 
6. Even folks who say we should restrict our use of intuitions on the 
basis of empirical evidence turn out to be making recommenda- 
tions that are rather less radical than those they are sometimes 
painted as making. Certain types of intuition are variable in cer-  
tain ways, they say, and you probably want  to  be  careful  with 
those intuitions. 
 
4 Moreover, it seems that Kornblith’s only target is pretheoretic intuitions about cases  
that are immediately obvious. Kornblith says, for example: “The standard approach in 
philosophy of beginning with individual cases is no different in kind than selecting clear- 
cut cases of a natural kind for further investigation. . . . [This,] however,  should not be   
seen as simply a matter of consulting our intuitions about cases. The features which mem- 
bers of a kind share . . . may be ones which are not immediately apparent” (2007, 47). 
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7. Finally, it turns out the substance of Cummins’s position is that 
intuitions can’t play the role in reflective equilibrium in philoso- 
phy that observations play in science.5 Cummins’s  reasoning  is 
that intuitions stem from either explicit or tacit  theories.  Cum- 
mins thinks that explicit theories, if they ground intuitions, sup- 
plant any epistemic contribution that intuitions might make, and 
tacit theories fare no better, since they are going to be biased (if 
acquired) or are likely to be pretty inaccurate (if innate). This 
argument is too fast, however; the conclusion that we shouldn’t   
use intuitions or that intuitions are  useless would  be  premature. 
No one thinks inquirers should eschew all sources that  are  less 
than perfect. A more sensible response to Cummins’s considera- 
tions is that we should be more careful with intuitions. 
 
 
1.3 The Need for Reorientation 
In other words, the slogan versions of these views oversell the criticisms 
these folks truly offer. None of these methodologists has any robust 
criticism to offer that targets the na€ıve picture of intuitions’ role in phi- 
losophy. Insofar as these criticisms damage the  view  that  intuitions  play 
an evidential role in philosophy, it is only a rather specific version  of that 
view which is damaged: the view that says the way that intu- itions play 
an evidential role in philosophy is by philosophers using intuitions as 
premises (or to support premises) in arguments. All these arguments, 
however, are widely taken to do rather  more general dam-  age to the 
view that intuitions do or should play an evidential role in philosophy—
that’s the sense in which I think that the way methodolog- ical discussion 
proceeds often fails to engage with the na€ıve picture. 
Now I should note that all the arguments and positions surveyed 
above do make important contributions to our understanding of philo- 
sophical methods. What they make clear is that it is incredibly difficult  to 
elaborate on the na€ıve picture without painting a picture that is obviously 
problematic. For example, it is problematic to think that intuitions 
compose the bulk of philosophers’ evidence and  that  we  don’t allow 
other considerations to influence  our  theorizing.  Likewise, it is 
problematic to think that what plays the justificatory role when 
philosophers appeal to cases is an intuition about a case rather than an 
(intuitive) fact about the case.  It is also problematic to think that once   
we appeal to an intuition, our case  rests on  it and we won’t  be willing  
to adduce  further considerations.  To  think  that intuitions  are  somehow 
 
5 At least, that’s what I take his arguments to establish (if anything).  I  don’t deny that 
his explicit statements of his views are somewhat stronger. 
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special and their use is somehow distinctively philosophical is perhaps 
the most problematic of them all. 
To take these contributions to cast doubt on the general idea that intu- 
itions do or should play an evidential role in philosophy, however, is to miss 
the point of why it makes sense to methodologically examine the role of intu- 
itions in philosophy in the first place. Those are my misgivings. I think that 
fixating on whether intuitions are or should be used as evidence by philoso- 
phers in their arguments leads methodology astray. Perhaps more precisely, I 
think the problem is the tendency to equate the basic na€ıve view that a good 
story about philosophical methodology and/or the epistemology of philoso- 
phy would do well to say something about intuitions and this rather more 
specific view. What to do? The debate needs reorienting. We need a better 
framework for thinking about the role of intuitions in philosophy—one that 
allows methodologists to better engage with the na€ıve picture. Of course, 
until I provide a better way to elaborate upon the na€ıve picture, I might be 
accused of merely stalling a bad debate rather than having advanced a good 
one. So, here goes....  
 
2. The Abductive Model 
Here’s the basic abductive model. The overall project of giving a theory of 
some phenomenon U is at heart an abductive exercise. We want  a theory 
that best explains the evidence we have about U. We have a lot of evidence. 
In philosophy, and probably elsewhere too, much of that evidence either 
comes from intuition (we come to believe the relevant propositions via intu- 
ition) or is psychological (it consists in claims about what we find intuitive, 
about how our intuitive processes work, and so forth). 
There are two things I need to  elaborate  upon  here.  (1)  What  I 
mean by saying philosophers have a lot of evidence, including intu- 
itions. (2) What I mean by saying philosophy is at heart an abductive 
exercise. But first let me remind the reader about the nature of the sug- 
gestion I aim to provide. The point of this article is to suggest a reor- 
ientation of philosophical methodology. The suggested reorientation is 
(i) to stop thinking about the role of intuitions as evidence in philoso-  
phy by starting with questions like “What’s playing the role of evidence 
in philosophers’ arguments?” and “When philosophers argue, what do 
they explicitly appeal to as evidence?” and (ii) to start  instead  with 
some sort of minimal abductive picture.6 
The abductive model really is supposed to be minimal. My aim is not 
to articulate a fully worked-out account of philosophical methodology or 
 
6  This is not a principled maneuver,  in that I don’t think there is an in-principle rea-    
son why approaching the issue by asking such questions is problematic. Rather, it is a 
pragmatic one. By focusing on such questions, the debate seems to have  gone awry.  If  
there is an alternative, it might be worth a shot. 
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epistemology. Rather, my aim is to suggest that those who are interested 
in articulating a fully worked-out account of philosophical methodology 
or epistemology should start by thinking about philosophy as being at 
heart an abductive enterprise. I don’t claim to have already worked out 
exactly how philosophy works or should work. If I had, then I wouldn’t 
be suggesting a reorientation of methodological discussion and would 
instead be going with a rather stronger headline.7 So, let me be clear up 
front that there are various things one might want from “an abductive 
model of (intuitions’ role in) philosophical inquiry” that my abductive 
model will not give you. I’ll address some of these in a moment when I 
articulate what my abductive model does say and what it does not say  
when it says that philosophical inquiry is abductive at heart. 
 
2.1 Philosophers Have Lots of Evidence 
Philosophers have lots of types of evidence. A basic distinction  we  
might make is that between first-order and second-order evidence.8 
Suppose that one is engaged in, for  example,  theory  of  knowl-  
edge. Philosophers interested in giving an account of knowledge  can  
and do draw on all of the following first-order evidence: ordinary 
judgments about cases supply or put us in contact with certain facts; 
linguistic data of various kinds put us in contact with others; cross- 
cultural linguistic or psychological data give  us  others;  reflecting  on 
the social function that the concept of  knowledge has is also impor-   
tant; thinking about the varying epistemic situations of different 
demographic groups, for example, epistemic injustice, is an important 
source of insight; so too is information about our belief-forming 
processes or aids, for example, perception and science,  and  informa- 
tion about testimonial practices and how they develop. So, more  
generally speaking, we might say that philosophers’ first-order evi-  
dence concerns facts about cases, situations, propositions about the 
world, maths and  logic,  and  so  on.  We  come  to  believe  such  facts  
in a variety of ways. Some we come to believe using  our  intuitions, 
while others come from scientific findings, our experience, phenome- 
nology, and so forth. 
Second-order evidence, then, concerns facts about our first-order 
evidence. Philosophers’ second-order evidence includes facts about 
 
7 One way to put this might be to say that the aims of this article might be said to be 
metamethological rather than straightforwardly methodological (a similar distinction is 
employed in Andow 2016). 
8 Don’t take the distinction between first-order and second-order evidence too  seri- 
ously. There are not two distinct kinds of evidence. We have evidence. Some of it concerns 
other evidence. The distinction is just trying mark that fact. 
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what “we,” people generally or perhaps some particular linguistic 
community, find intuitive. Second-order evidence also includes many 
other facts: about what our intuitions entail; about  where  our  intu-  
itions come from;  about  how  we  come  to  our  judgments  about  
cases; about how strong our intuitions are; about how reliable our 
intuitions are about the particular subject matter in hand; about the 
stability of our intuitions; and so on  for  other  sources  of  evidence,  
like the instruments of science or linguistic data. Second-order evi-  
dence about knowledge, for example, might  include  facts  about  how 
we identify the social function of the concept of knowledge. Second- 
order evidence also includes facts about arguments for or  against  
various positions in  the  vicinity,  and  reasons  too.  For  example, 
among the evidence relevant to giving a  theory  of  the  content  of  
moral claims is the fact that the Frege-Geach  problem  is  a  hurdle  
faced by noncognitivists. 
 
2.2 Philosophy Is Abductive at Heart 
This is not a methodological claim  in  the  sense  of  a  claim  about  
what philosophers do day-to-day, about what kinds of move they 
purposefully employ, or about what types of argument or inference 
philosophers employ. Rather, the claim that philosophical inquiry is 
abductive at heart is  supposed  to  be  a  deep  claim  about  what  kind  
of enterprise doing philosophy  is.  The  thought  is  that  by  starting  
with a broadly abductive picture of what  kind  of  enterprise  philoso- 
phy is, we can then start  to  work  out  the  details—for  example,  we  
can start to ask  questions  about  how  intuitions  play  an  evidential  
role in philosophy, in a way that doesn’t run the  risk  of  failing  to 
engage with the reasons why it makes sense to methodologically  
examine the role of intuitions in philosophy. There isn’t  really  any-  
thing more  to  the  abductive  model  that  I  think  we  should  start  
with, beyond  what  I  have  already  stated.  I  do,  however,  want  to  
take some time to distance  myself from  various  claims  that  it  might 
be supposed an advocate of an abductive model  of  philosophical  
inquiry might endorse. 
To say philosophical inquiry is abductive at heart is not to say that 
abductive inferences should or do play a big role in day-to-day philoso- 
phizing. Philosophy might essentially be an abductive enterprise even if  
it were the case that no philosopher had ever utilized any form of 
abductive inference. Doubtless, philosophers often do make abductive 
inferences, but that claim is not what characterizes the abductive model of 
philosophical inquiry. 
To say that intuitions are part of the evidence that philosophical 
inquiry attempts to explain is not to say that explicit appeals to 
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intuitions as evidence should or do play a big role in actual philoso- 
phizing.9 The whole point of suggesting the abductive model as an 
alternative is to get away from the focus that methodology has had on 
questions about whether philosophers use intuitions as evidence in such-
and-such an argument. To say that philosophical inquiry is abduc- tive at 
heart is not to say that there is anything distinctively philosophi- cal 
about inquiry that is abductive at heart. (Indeed, it sounds pretty plausible 
to me to say that all inquiry is abductive at heart and that philosophy is 
the most general form of inquiry there is.  But  I don’t argue for either of 
those claims here.) Likewise, to say that philosophi- cal inquiry is aimed 
toward explaining the  evidence  isn’t  to  suggest that the philosopher’s 
search is one for any particular type of explana- tion. There are many 
types of explanation. There are causal explana- tions. There are 
deductive-nomological  explanations.  There may even  be some 
distinctively philosophical variety of explanation. My sense is that 
different philosophical debates are likely after different types of 
explanation. Certain debates in philosophy of biology might be after 
causal explanations. Certain debates  about  grounding  relations  might 
be after a distinctively philosophical explanation. But the claim made    
by the abductive model is simply that philosophy is at heart an abduc- 
tive exercise, not that it is after any particular variety of explanation. 
The model I suggest we start with when thinking about the role of 
intuitions in philosophy is simply that what philosophy as an enterprise  
is ultimately after is the best explanation of all the available evidence, 
which includes intuitions and evidence about intuitions. Now  we can 
start asking more procedural, methodological questions about how phi- 
losophy is done and about good, bad, and better ways of going about 
philosophizing. 
 
2.3 How Does the Abductive Model Help? 
This abductive model can provide us with a better starting point from 
which to begin our exploration of the role of intuitions in our evidence 
for positions. 
Let’s take the example of the role of intuitions in my evidence against 
the justified true belief (JTB) account of knowledge. I am fairly confi- 
dent that the JTB account of knowledge is not the best account. Part of 
 
9 I’m relying on a distinction between  (i)  facts that  constitute our evidence and (ii)  
facts we actually appeal to. In any domain, it would be absurd to think that  nothing to 
which we don’t explicitly appeal constitutes part of our evidence. One adduces pertinent 
facts, salient facts, facts one expects one’s interlocutors to recognize. One’s evidence 
includes lots of other things too.  We  shouldn’t be  tempted to  think a  class  of facts are  
not actually part of philosophers’ evidence, simply because philosophers tend  not  to  
appeal to such facts. 
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my evidence involves Gettier cases in which folks have JTB without 
knowing. If challenged, I can adduce (facts about) such cases as evi- 
dence. The evidence I adduce, however, is far from being my entire evi- 
dence. I have a great amount and variety  of  evidence  behind  my 
position. I have thought about what would follow from treating  gettier- 
ized protagonists as being unjustified. I have paid close attention to how 
robust my commitment to Gettier cases being cases of non-knowledge is.  
I have tried and failed to put myself in the position of folks who are will- 
ing to attribute knowledge. I also got really worried when it looked as if 
there might be significant cultural variation in intuitions about Gettier 
cases. Part of my current evidence consists in there being no strong and 
concrete reason to doubt my ability to discern knowledge from non- 
knowledge. So I have lots of evidence,  not just the bits of evidence that  
I’d be likely to evince in defense of my position. 
How does the minimal abductive model deal with this  example?  
First, it is completely uncontroversial that intuitions and/or evidence 
about intuitions—in the somewhat vague rather imprecise notion that 
collects various things like pretheoretic beliefs and judgments we are 
disposed to have concerning actual and hypothetical cases, and other  
stuff too—are part of my evidence here. So the abductive model doesn’t 
run the risk of completely failing to engage with the na€ıve picture. 
Second, the abductive model now provides us with a framework to  
ask questions about what is going on when philosophers advance argu- 
ments. In this case, we might ask exactly what  is going when people    
use arguments such as Gettier’s against the JTB account of knowledge. 
We  can  ask:  What  role  are  arguments  playing  vis-a`-vis  philosophers’ 
evidence? Here’s an answer worth considering: The role of arguments is 
to draw attention to particular bits of evidence in the hope of persuad-  
ing the unpersuaded. What evidence might that be? At this point in the 
inquiry, we can hand the baton back to the debates that have been rag-  
ing among philosophical methodologists in recent years on this very 
topic. Importantly, however, the question “Do (or  should)  intuitions  
play a role in this argument?” will not be understood to be equivalent     
to “Is (or should) evidence from or relating to intuitions (be) any 
important part of our evidence against the JTB account?” (In particu-   
lar, a negative answer to the first question won’t be taken to entail a 
negative answer to the second.) 
Third, the abductive model allows us to incorporate any  genuine 
insights from the extant methodological literature that I surveyed at the 
beginning. For example, the abductive model allows one to say that it is 
problematic to think that what plays the evidential role when  philoso- 
phers appeal to cases is an intuition about a case rather than a(n) (intui- 
tive) fact about the case. But, on the other hand, it also allows one to 
recognize that this is not all there is to be said (as the relevant body of 
evidence is far more extensive than the evidence evinced, and this may 
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well include intuitions or facts about intuitions rather than just intuitive 
facts). For another example, the abductive model allows recognition that 
intuitions do not compose the bulk of philosophers’  evidence and that   
we allow other considerations to influence our theorizing. 
Fourth, in the end, there doesn’t seem to be any obvious reason why 
any of the methodologists whose views I surveyed at the beginning 
should object to this general abductive picture. In particular,  they all 
seem amenable to the idea that evidence about evidence, in particular 
evidence about intuitions, is philosophically relevant in some more 
holistic way (even if the slogan versions of their views would suggest 
otherwise).10 Here are a few examples. 
1. Williamson claims: “If the experiments [looking  at  intuitions]  
have been properly designed and conducted, they still reveal unex- 
pected and intriguing patterns in  ordinary  human  judgments  
about philosophically central matters . . .  simply ignoring them 
would be imprudent and incurious. Even if they turn out to result 
from various kinds of bias, a philosophical training is unlikely to 
render one entirely immune to such bias.  Understanding a source  
of bias is a step towards correcting for it” (2013, 472). 
2. Ichikawa largely agrees with Alexander and Weinberg (2007) when 
they say  that a certain kind of import such evidence might have 
(the idea philosophers should be worried about their use of intu- 
itions) “does not need to turn on a (potentially mistaken) psycho- 
logization of philosophers’ evidence. . . . In terms that Williamson 
should be happy with, the challenge reveals that at the present time 
philosophers may just not know what their evidence really is. And 
the true extent of their evidence is not, we think, something that 
they will be able to learn from their armchairs” (2014, 72). The non-
armchair resources they have in mind are those that gather empirical 
evidence about our intuitions, ordinary judgment-  forming 
processes, and so on. 
3. Ichikawa and Jarvis claim: “What [evidences of intuitions’ unreli- 
ability] indubitably show is that many, perhaps all, judgments that 
are putatively a priori knowledge are susceptible to a posteriori 
defeaters. One can always acquire empirical reason to believe that 
one’s a priori faculties are functioning poorly and ought not to  
be trusted” (2013, 188). 
 
10 Perhaps the only exception is Cappelen (2012). He seems to think that information 
about our judgment-forming processes is utterly irrelevant in philosophy. His book has a 
chapter entitled “A Big Mistake: Experimental Philosophy,” and the mistake he thinks 
experimental philosophers make is to think such information could be relevant. It seems, 
however, that Cappelen overlooks, rather than argues against, the types of potential  
import discussed by these other authors. 
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4. Deutsch expresses interest in finding  out  more  about  intuitions 
but thinks that the project won’t be a philosophical one: “What 
explains cross-cultural variability in philosophical intuitions, even  
if it is a mistake to think such variability poses a severe problem   
for traditional philosophizing? That is a good question—for  a  
social scientist” (2010, 459). But that shouldn’t concern us: lots of 
our evidence in philosophy is gathered by nonphilosophers  (such  
as physicists, psychologists, anthropologists, and so on). 
 
 
2.4 Hasn’t X Already Made This Suggestion? 
I don’t claim to be the first person to have said that abduction and 
philosophical methods or epistemology might have something to do 
with each other. Various other authors have recently suggested that 
philosophy may involve abduction to a rather larger extent than has 
traditionally been assumed. My suggestion, however, is rather more 
than that, and none of these recent authors has suggested the  
approach to methodology that I have advocated here. Nonetheless, I  
do take the presence of this trend toward thinking about the rela-    
tion between philosophy, methodology, and abduction to be a source 
of optimism that the world of philosophical methodology may  be 
open to my suggestion. So, before I finish, let me quickly  run  
through some of these hints of abductive flavors in other authors by 
means of (a) noting how my  suggestion differs and (b) noting that  
the time seems to be ripe for  considering a more abductive picture    
of philosophical inquiry. 
 
1. Perhaps the closest to the abductive picture I have painted is 
apparent in Love (2013). Love brings out an abductive theme in 
two recent books, Alexander 2012 and Cappelen 2012. These 
authors’ pictures of philosophical methods are otherwise diamet- 
rically opposed, but Love makes clear that they share a common 
assumption that philosophy shares with science the method of 
“hypothesis testing and theory confirmation,” according to which 
“a mature . . .  theory is one that better explains the array of data 
available than its competitors” (Love 2013, 291). Love, however, 
wishes to distance himself from this picture of inquiry in either 
science or philosophy. Cappelen thinks evidence about intuitions 
is simply irrelevant in philosophy (as discussed earlier). And 
Alexander, although coming close to diagnosing a rather similar 
issue in Williamson 2007 to that I discuss above (Alexander 2012, 
102–7), leans instead on a “dialectical” model of the role intu- 
itions play in arguments. 
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2. Ichikawa and Jarvis also endorse a similar idea that philosophy 
shares an abductive flavor with other types of inquiry: 
“Philosophical inquiry draws on the same cognitive resources that 
subjects marshal in ordinary cases of so-called ‘abductive’ inquiry. 
Even when instancing pure rational  thinking,  philosophical  
inquiry sometimes has the flavor of abduction whereby global the- 
oretical considerations throughout one’s ‘web of  belief’  are 
brought to bear on answering a philosophical question” (2013, 4). 
Later in the book, it is suggested that this makes philosophical 
thinking structurally analogous to “scientific thinking” (223). 
However, Ichikawa and Jarvis’s overall model of inquiry doesn’t 
seem to be one that is abductive at  heart, and their model of the  
role of intuitions in philosophy is careful not to place them in an 
evidential role. 
3. Deutsch (2015) gives time to the idea that the arguments philoso- 
phers actually give—such as Gettier’s—might be abductive in 
character at least in part. I make no such claim. 
4. Cummins (1998) suggests that instead of placing such great 
emphasis on intuitions about cases we should do as scientists do 
and place a greater emphasis on appeals to explanatory virtue. 
His is a procedural suggestion, however, and a supposedly amelio- 
rative one, so he is doing something rather different. 
5. Various folks have also looked at the role of explanation in phi- 
losophy from rather different angles again—for example, whether 
certain philosophical positions and arguments are engaged in 
explaining certain facts (for discussion, see Daly 2010, chap. 5) or 
whether metaphysicians’ talk of “fundamentality” is best under- 
stood in terms of explanation (see Jenkins 2013). Again, this isn’t 
what I’m doing. 
 
Although these projects are obviously not  completely  unrelated  to 
my current project, none of them is suggesting that it would be benefi- 
cial to approach questions about intuitions, evidence, and philosophy 
with a broadly abductive picture of philosophical inquiry. Indeed, none 
makes a metamethodological point about how methodologists should 
proceed.11 
 
3. Conclusion 
The ambitions of this article are pretty modest. I do  not  intend  to  
defend a fully detailed model of how philosophy works in terms either 
 
11 One important sign that some of these folks are not making anything like the same 
suggestion I make here is that they also appear in the list of examples I gave near the 
beginning of the article. 
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of its methods or of its epistemology. The aim is to provide a framework 
for methodological discussion, especially about the role of intuitions in 
philosophy, which helps to deal with certain misgivings that I have about 
the way discussion in philosophical methodology typically proceeds. 
The least modest central claims of the article can be summarized as 
follows. 
 
1. There is something wrong with the way that methodological dis- 
cussion often proceeds. For instance, I really think it is problem-  
atic to approach the examination of the role of intuitions in 
philosophy in such a way that one might end  up  defending  the 
idea that philosophers don’t use intuitions but that in no way 
impugns the na€ıve   picture according to which intuitions do play   
an important role in philosophy and which provided the motivation 
for talking about philosophical methodology in terms of intuitions in 
the first place. 
2. Second, one way to reorient philosophical methodology such that 
this sort of regrettable situation does not occur is for the method- 
ologist to start out with the sort of minimal abductive model of 
philosophical inquiry which I suggest. The starting picture should 
be a model according to which evidence from intuitions is part of 
philosophers’ evidence and the aim of inquiry is to end up with a 
theory that best explains all the evidence (where what is meant by 
“intuitions” is a somewhat vague and imprecise collecting of vari- 
ous things like pretheoretic beliefs and judgments we are disposed 
to have concerning actual and hypothetical cases, and other stuff 
too). This starting point is supposed to be an alternative to the 
starting point that many implicitly seem to adopt: that any inter- 
esting question about the role of intuitions in philosophy concerns 
whether philosophers use intuitions as evidence when they provide 
certain kinds of arguments. 
3. Third, it would be a good idea for methodologists to use some- 
thing like the outlook provided by the abductive model  rather  
more often. 
 
But I’ll finish by emphasizing once again that there’s really no huge 
revolution suggested here. Although I think certain ways of approach-  
ing philosophical methodology have been problematic,  it  is  not  as  if 
the results of approaching methodology in those ways need to be wiped 
from the slate. Indeed, it is a virtue of the abductive model that having 
adopted such an outlook one can nonetheless be well placed to incor- 
porate the various insights provided by other methodologists—includ- 
ing those who have  criticized the idea that philosophers use intuitions    
or have criticized intuition use—albeit not  in  their  sloganized  forms. 
For example, one is well placed to accept that psychological facts are 
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rarely actually adduced as evidence by  philosophers  (and  perhaps  that 
it would be problematic for psychological facts to be used in this way). 
For another example, one is well placed to accept that it is healthy to 
retain some skepticism about (and caution when) relying upon evidence 
from or about intuitions. The lens  provided  by  the  abductive  model 
will help one see any unhelpful slogans for what they are but needn’t 
impede incorporating any insights that lie behind those slogans. 
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